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Abstract 
The current paradigm for hospital outbreak detection and investigation is based on 
methodology first developed over 150 years ago. Daily surveillance to detect patients 
positive for pathogens of particular importance for nosocomial infection is supported by 
epidemiological investigation of their relationship in time and place, and to identify any 
other factor that could link them. The antibiotic resistance pattern is commonly used as 
a surrogate for bacterial relatedness, although this lacks sensitivity and specificity. 
Typing may be used to define bacterial relatedness although routine methods lack 
sufficient discriminatory power to distinguish relatedness beyond the level of bacterial 
clones. Ultimately, the identification of an outbreak remains a predominately subjective 
process reliant on the intuition of experienced infection control professionals. Here, we 
propose a redesign of hospital outbreak detection and investigation in which bacterial 
species associated with nosocomial transmission and infection undergo routine 
prospective whole genome sequencing. Further investigation is based on the probability 
that isolates are associated with an outbreak, which is based on the degree of genetic 
relatedness between isolates. Evidence is provided that supports the basis for this model 
based on studies of MRSA (methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus), together with 
the benefits of a ‘Sequence First’ approach. The feasibility of implementation is 
discussed, together with residual barriers that need to be overcome prior to 
implementation.  
  
 3 
Text 
The current paradigm for hospital outbreak detection and investigation is based on a 
combination of surveillance and epidemiology, which is sometimes referred to as ‘shoe 
leather epidemiology’. The origins of this approach date back more than 150 years ago 
to John Snow, a public health physician and one of the founders of modern 
epidemiology. He is best known for his work on cholera and in particular, his 
investigation of a cholera outbreak in Soho in 1854 [1]. Mapping deaths from cholera 
combined with a detailed investigation of the consumption of water from a pump in 
Broad Street led Snow to propose that there was a direct link between the two, and 
enabled him to convince the local council to remove the pump handle. This was 
particularly impressive since the prevailing theory for infectious disease causation at the 
time was based on miasma (bad air) rather than germ theory. 
 
Hospital outbreak detection, investigation and control follows a paradigm that is little 
changed from the methodology described by John Snow (Figure 1A). Daily surveillance 
is undertaken for patients who are positive for pathogens of particular importance for 
nosocomial infection, including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), 
Clostridium difficile and Enterobacteriaceae that are resistant to the carbapenem drugs. 
The detection of two or more patients who are positive for the same indicator organism 
is investigated using hospital databases and ward visits to determine whether cases have 
overlapped in time and place, and to identify any other factor that could link them. All 
of the available information is then reviewed to assess the probability of an outbreak and 
the need for further investigation (e.g. screening other patients, staff and/or equipment) 
and interventions (e.g. enhanced infection control measures, cleaning). Some of this data 
analysis can be automated using current commercially available infection control IT 
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systems directly feeding off laboratory data, but ultimately the identification of an 
outbreak remains a predominately subjective process reliant on the intuition of the 
infection control professionals involved. 
 
Bacterial typing to determine the degree of relatedness between isolates cultured from 
patients involved in a putative outbreak may be used downstream of surveillance and 
clinical epidemiology. Enthusiasm for bacterial typing during an outbreak investigation 
is tempered by the failure of commonly available typing methods to provide information 
that influences decisions or practice. Typing is often performed in centralised reference 
laboratories and results may take days or weeks to reach the sender because of the 
accumulated time taken to transport and process the isolate, by which time the need to 
establish relatedness has often dwindled. Available methods also fail to distinguish 
between isolates that belong to the same clone. This is clinically important because many 
nosocomial pathogens often belong to a restricted number of clones. For example, 
around three quarters of all MRSA associated with invasive disease or carriage in 
healthcare or community settings in the United Kingdom (UK) are multilocus sequence 
type (ST) 22 [2], which is poorly resolved by other typing methods such as pulsed-field 
gel electrophoresis or spa typing. As a result, establishing that all isolates from a patient 
cluster are ST 22 neither confirms nor refutes an outbreak. 
 
The first indication that bacterial whole genome sequencing could have major utility for 
outbreak investigation came in 2010 with the publication of a study that compared the 
genomes of 63 MRSA isolates drawn from a global collection isolated between 1982 
and 2003, all of which belonged to a single clone (ST 239) [3]. The phylogenetic analysis 
was based on variable genetic sites in the core genome (genes that are conserved across 
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the species). This demonstrated extensive genetic heterogeneity with a total of 4310 
variable sites detected across the collection, and no two strains were identical. 
Comparison with the results of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis and spa typing 
confirmed the overwhelming superiority of sequencing based on degree of 
discrimination between isolates. Global structuring was identified based on phylogenetic 
clustering of genomes by geographic region of isolation, and there was genetic evidence 
for intercontinental transmission. Of particular note for hospital-based infection control 
was the observation that 5 of 20 isolates collected over 7 months at a single hospital in 
Thailand were differentiated by only 14 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which 
based on the estimated rate of evolution over time (one core genome SNP every 6 weeks) 
indicated that they were highly related. Four of these isolates had been cultured within 
a 16 day period from patients located in adjacent hospital blocks.  
 
Although the ability to sequence and compare numerous bacterial genomes represented 
a major technological advance, one of the limitations for its translation into infection 
control practice was the time taken to generate sequence data. The global MRSA 
collection described above was sequenced using an Illumina Genome Analyzer GAII 
[3], which was designed with human genomes in mind and generated large amounts of 
sequence data over a run time of more than a week. This meant that sequencing of much 
smaller bacterial genomes using this instrument was inefficient and costly unless large 
numbers of isolates were sequenced together (multiplexed), and was too slow for use in 
an acute outbreak. This barrier was overcome with the development of benchtop 
instruments such as the Illumina MiSeq, which at the time of release was capable of 
sequencing around 10 isolates at the same time with a run time of around a day. The first 
application of the Illumina HiSeq to an outbreak investigation was published in 2012 
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[4]. This proof-of-principle study for sequencing of hospital outbreaks undertook a 
retrospective investigation of an MRSA ST 22 outbreak in a neonatal intensive care unit, 
and demonstrated that isolates (patients) involved in an outbreak could be separated 
from those that were not. This study also presented early evidence that sequence data 
could be used to accurately predict phenotypic antibiotic susceptibility, and to detect the 
presence of numerous toxin genes.  
 
The next step was to determine the added value of bacterial sequencing versus what 
could be achieved through standard infection control investigation alone. A study 
published in 2013 not only demonstrated significant superiority of standard practice plus 
sequencing, but also demonstrated that this could bring about an infection control 
intervention that was associated with cessation of an outbreak [5]. The study began as a 
retrospective investigation of a cluster of MRSA cases in a special care baby unit 
(SCBU), where weekly MRSA screening of all infants was part of routine practice. The 
identification of three MRSA positive infants in the SCBU with overlapping admission 
dates led to a major infection control investigation, including a 6 month look back 
exercise. Seventeen MRSA positive infants were identified in this 6 month period. After 
a detailed review, these cases were not considered to represent an extended outbreak, in 
part because there were several gaps in time when no MRSA cases were identified by 
screening. By contrast, sequencing identified that 14 infants were positive for MRSA 
that were highly related, providing strong evidence for an outbreak. Armed with this 
information and the subsequent detection of a new case who carried the outbreak strain, 
an investigation was conducted of MRSA carriage by staff. Rapid sequencing of MRSA 
isolated from a staff carrier using a benchtop instrument confirmed that they carried the 
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outbreak strain. The staff member was temporarily removed from the ward and 
decolonised, which was associated with a cessation of the outbreak. 
 
The SCBU study also identified the potential for sequencing to discover unsuspected 
nosocomial MRSA transmission [5]. Additional sequencing of 19 MRSA isolates 
cultured in the routine laboratory that were chosen without prior epidemiological 
information (but selected on antibiotic resistance pattern) identified that the outbreak 
strain had spread into the community, and that these isolates were associated with 
clinical disease. Epidemiological investigation identified that the people affected were 
infants who had been inpatients on SCBU but were not known to be MRSA positive by 
the time of discharge; mothers of infants, some of whom were not SCBU inpatients 
(suggesting spread between mothers in the maternity ward); and partners of affected 
mothers and/or infants (Figure 2) [5]. This degree of forensic epidemiology was only 
possible because of the genomic information, which allowed the tracing of individual 
transmission pathways within and between families. A follow on study demonstrated 
that the SCBU outbreak strain had persisted in the community population since its 
introduction [6].  
 
Sequencing has also been shown to have utility in ruling out outbreaks in instances 
where patient clusters have occurred by chance [7].  Sequencing of MRSA associated 
with five episodes of bloodstream infection in four patients who had overlapping 
admissions to a specialist hepatology unit demonstrated unequivocally that the four 
cases were unrelated [7]. Placing the bloodstream isolates within a local and global 
phylogenetic tree of MRSA genomes from the same lineage (ST 22) demonstrated that 
the isolates from the four patients were highly diverse (Figure 3). This was consistent 
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with the acquisition and importation of each MRSA from the wider referral 
network. Refuting outbreaks could  reduce unnecessary infection control investigation 
and interventions. Furthermore, no sequence data are wasted since these provide the 
potential pool from which new outbreaks could arise, and so represent important genetic 
context for prospective sequencing and genomic comparisons. 
 
Bacterial sequencing has also been used as a research tool to investigate nosocomial 
outbreaks caused by a range of additional bacterial species, including Clostridium 
difficile and multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacteria such as Klebsiella pneumoniae 
[8-11]. Although not the focus of this review, sequencing has also been evaluated and 
introduced for the detection of foodborne outbreaks, and to predict phenotypic antibiotic 
susceptibility and transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis [12-14]. These studies 
provide unequivocal evidence for the superiority of sequencing to distinguish whether a 
range of bacterial species are linked to an outbreak.  
 
Having established that bacterial sequencing could introduce a major enhancement to 
infection control practice, a key question is whether this should be used as a late adjunct 
when an outbreak is suspected or underway (reflecting the way that typing is currently 
implemented), or used more proactively (Figure 1B). Sequencing and real-time analysis 
of all isolates belonging to specific bacterial species as a matter of routine could provide 
an early warning system and provide the opportunity to intervene and prevent further 
transmission and involvement of new cases. However, this would represent a 
fundamental paradigm shift in practice, with sequence data taking a leading role in 
directing outbreak investigation activity. Supporting its proactive use is the observation 
in the SBCU outbreak study described above [5] that sequencing of MRSA isolates from 
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the first two infants involved in the outbreak could have resulted in much earlier 
detection and control, and may have prevented the associated morbidity from infection 
in later cases. A shift in practice of this magnitude, however, requires evidence that goes 
beyond observation.  
 
The first published evidence for the utility of proactive sequencing came from a study 
of genomic surveillance of MRSA isolated in a large clinical microbiology laboratory 
in the East of England over 12 months [15]. This laboratory received samples from 75 
General Practitioner (GP) surgeries and 3 hospitals, and during the study period 
identified 1465 people who were carrying and/or infected by MRSA, from whom 2282 
MRSA isolates were sequenced [15]. Around 80% of isolates were from samples 
submitted by hospitals, and the remaining samples originated from GP surgeries. 
Integration of genomic and epidemiological data led to the identification of 173 separate 
transmission clusters containing between 2 and 44 cases and involving 598 people, none 
of which were detected by conventional infection control approaches. Furthermore, 27 
clusters occurred outside of hospital, one of which involved 15 people linked to a single 
GP practice, the majority of whom had attended a leg ulcer/podiatry clinic [16].  From 
this, it is clear that proactive sequencing detects many more outbreaks, and identifies 
linkages between hospitals and the community.  
 
There has been considerable debate in the past about where pathogen sequencing should 
be performed, and in particular whether this should be centralised (for example, using 
facilities developed for human genome sequencing), or distributed throughout the 
network of hospital-based diagnostic laboratories. The need to generate and interpret 
data in the shortest possible time so that on-going transmission can be prevented means 
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that this is most likely to be supported by local sequencing in large diagnostic 
laboratories. Hospitals that maintain smaller laboratories that cannot justify the cost of 
implementation could refer isolates to reference laboratories, or alternatively use 
commercial sequencing providers although the turnaround time could prove a limitation 
[17]. However, the pace at which sequencing instruments are being developed for 
clinical practice means that this technique could be done anywhere with minimum 
training in the near future, rendering this debate obsolete. If bacterial sequencing is to 
be introduced locally, this will need to be technically feasible but is largely already 
within the capabilities of larger diagnostic laboratories. Methods for DNA extraction are 
in widespread use, preparation of DNA sequencing libraries is no more complex than 
many other diagnostic molecular methods, and commercially available sequencing 
instruments are simple to use. Furthermore, a laboratory with a high throughput of 
bacterial sequencing could justify the additional capital costs associated with automation 
of DNA extraction and library preparation. Standardised protocols will be required, but 
their development and dissemination could follow current best practice for the adoption 
of any laboratory method.  
 
Sequence data will need to be generated in a timescale that provides actionable 
information, guiding and improving practice rather than providing a retrospective view 
of no clinical impact or benefit. This is also achievable. The shortest possible turnaround 
would be achieved by sequencing bacteria directly from the patient specimen, but this 
is largely beyond what is technically feasible at the present time. Sequencing is currently 
performed from DNA extracted from a pure bacterial culture, which introduces a delay 
of around a day. This can be circumvented by performing DNA extraction and library 
preparation directly from bacterial colonies growing in the primary culture [18]. This 
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has been described for 17 bacterial pathogens responsible for severe human disease that 
were grown using standard diagnostic media and incubation conditions. Colony pick to 
completion of DNA library preparation can be achieved in around 4 hours using manual 
methods. The time taken to generate sequence data will depend on the sequencing 
instrument used, which for laboratory benchtop instruments range from several hours to 
a day. Important considerations when deciding on the appropriate sequencing instrument 
are cost (equipment, kits and reagents), throughput (matched against how many isolates 
a laboratory aims to sequence per day), time (for preparation and sequencing), and 
accuracy. Accuracy of sequence data is particularly important for outbreak 
investigations where the number of core genome SNPs are used to define relatedness. 
Accuracy will also be important for other indications, including the genetic prediction 
of resistance to an antibiotic that is mediated by point mutations in a chromosomal gene.  
 
Whilst most barriers to the clinical use of genomic surveillance have now been 
overcome, the most important remaining hurdle is the automated analysis of sequence 
data. Although the analysis of bacterial genomes is facilitated by the availability of 
numerous publicly available software scripts, this is highly specialised, time-consuming, 
and does not result in a read-out that is clinically meaningful to the majority of infection 
control staff. Several research groups and commercial companies are actively 
developing tools that automate the interpretation of bacterial sequence data specifically 
for use by infection control teams, and it is likely that tools will become available for 
the analysis of several of the major nosocomial pathogens in the next 12-18 months. 
Data on potential outbreaks could be fed back to infection control teams in real time to 
allow epidemiological information to be added and the outbreak confirmed or refuted. 
This is an important step, since genomic and epidemiological information are 
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complementary. The epidemiological information need not be onerous to collect and is 
likely to be readily available on hospital systems. While the most useful information 
might vary from one organism to another, for MRSA it was identified that recent hospital 
admissions, hospital ward, home postcode and registered GP practice were most helpful 
[15]. The report generated for infection control teams need to be fully comprehensible 
to users without bioinformatics training. A proposed whole genome sequencing 
clinical report has been devised for M. tuberculosis using a process of evidence-based 
design and evaluation [19], much of which is relevant to outbreaks in hospitals caused 
by other pathogens.  
 
Software that determines bacterial genome relatedness for outbreak investigation should 
be able to compare genomes generated within and between sequencing runs. Individual 
laboratories will want to accumulate their own reference library of genomes so that the 
latest data can be compared with those sequenced in the preceding days, weeks or 
months. Shorter timescales for genomic comparisons would identity active outbreaks, 
while links to isolates cultured over a longer timeframe may identify cryptic 
transmission in the past and high-risk areas that warrant increased infection control 
scrutiny. The computing power required to compare numerous bacterial genomes is 
likely to require the use of cloud-based facilities, and automated analysis pipelines will 
need to conform to data protection standards and ensure patient confidentiality. A logical 
progression from local analysis would be to compare isolates from different laboratories 
to identify broader patterns of transmission between healthcare providers, as well as re-
use of data for national surveillance. Future innovation includes the linkage of sequence 
data with bed management systems that track patient movement. The automated 
integration of genomic and patient movement data could generate a daily report of cases 
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who are positive for a highly related organism, and immediately highlight new cases in 
a developing or established outbreak. Furthermore, machine learning methods could be 
applied to such datasets to predict where and when outbreaks are likely to occur.  
 
Implementing genomic surveillance will be associated with an up-front cost, and the 
argument for introducing this innovation into routine practice will need to go beyond 
the purely scientific. Adopting routine genomic surveillance of nosocomial pathogens 
into the NHS and elsewhere will require evidence of cost effectiveness. Since carriage 
of nosocomial pathogens is asymptomatic, the benefit derived from genomic 
surveillance comes from preventing nosocomial infection that may follow a new 
acquisition event. Healthcare-associated infections caused by a range of pathogenic 
species prolong hospital stay, increase healthcare costs and lead to poorer patient 
outcomes. The benefits of proactive pathogen sequencing could include benefits to 
patients and financial savings. The latter may be associated with reduced patient stay 
and increased efficiency of infection control teams, although greater detection of true 
outbreaks may actually increase their workload. Economic evaluation of routine 
sequencing of nosocomial pathogens has not been reported to date and is needed if the 
case for routine bacterial sequencing is to be successfully argued.  
 
Arguments for adopting could also draw on the obvious case of need, the benefits from 
which are felt by the entire patient population. Outbreak detection is highly complex, 
since this requires infection control teams to keep track of potential points of contact 
between hundreds or thousands of patients in a given healthcare facility on a daily basis, 
often in the absence of technological solutions that fully automate this. Superimposed 
on this is the rate of patient movement within NHS hospitals, which is at an all-time 
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high. Patients with complex medical needs may be moved through several wards or 
specialities during their care pathway. In addition, the rising demand on NHS beds is 
being managed in part by repeatedly moving patients to maximise the use of a limited 
number of empty beds. Detecting outbreaks can be also very challenging when these are 
associated with transmission from one or more healthcare workers who work across 
several wards or healthcare areas, or who are based in a clinic from which patients may 
be admitted to unrelated wards. Proactive sequencing of targeted nosocomial pathogens 
could provide a technological solution to this complex environment and generate 
actionable information, both in hospitals and the community.  
 
Finally, genomic surveillance and the detection and control of hospital outbreaks is 
increasingly important at a time when the introduction of multidrug-resistant pathogens 
into hospitals is increasingly likely. Sequencing could play a substantial role in reducing 
the risk of drug-resistant infections in hospital patients, and the spread of such pathogens 
from hospitals into the community.  
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. Current and proposed approach to the detection of hospital outbreaks 
(a) Current practice for the detection of hospital outbreaks based on surveillance and 
epidemiology. The pattern of antibiotic resistance is commonly used as a surrogate for 
bacterial relatedness, and formal bacterial typing may be used during outbreak 
investigation. (b) A proposed alternative in which outbreak detection is led by routine 
sequencing of bacterial species that are commonly associated with nosocomial outbreaks 
and infection.  
 
Figure 2. Epidemiology and phylogeny of an MRSA outbreak 
Left: Timeline (in days) of an outbreak that affected infants on a Special Care Baby Unit, 
and that went on to affect family clusters. A total of 26 people were affected: infants 
treated on the SCBU who were known to be MRSA positive during admission (P1-14) 
or who were not known to be carriers during admission but were detected after discharge 
(P16-18), mothers who were (P19-22), or were not (P23-24) inpatients on the maternity 
ward; and partners (P25-26). The length of the boxes shown for infants on SCBU 
represent duration of hospital stay. A healthcare worker was detected who was also 
carrying the outbreak strain (shown by H). Darker vertical blue blocks show times on 
the SCBU when there were no known carriers of MRSA. 
Right: Phylogenetic tree of MRSA isolated from patients 1-26, together with 20 
individual MRSA colonies from a staff member (shown by H). SNP=single-nucleotide 
polymorphism. Adapted from reference 5.  
 
Figure 3. Contextualization of outbreak investigations of CC22 MRSA studied at 
Cambridge University Hospitals 
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The maximum likelihood tree was based on 22,238 core SNPs for 783 ST22 genomes 
drawn from the British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy bacteraemia resistance 
surveillance programme between 2001 and 2010, 7 isolates from an MRSA outbreak on 
a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU, green),4 15 isolates from an MRSA outbreak that 
focused on a special care baby unit (SCBU, orange) but extended to other wards and the 
community,5 and 42 isolates sequenced as part of an MRSA outbreak investigation on a 
hepatology ward (nine isolates from four patients with bacteraemia [P1-4; pink filled 
dots] and the remainder from patients who were MRSA carriers on the same ward during 
a comparable timeframe [pink open dots]).7 Reproduced from reference 2. 
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